DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 043 125 EA 003 076

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TITLE Governance and Politics of Education in Israel: Culture Bound or Free?
PUB DATE [70]
NOTE 37p.

EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF-$0.25 HC-$1.95
DESCRIPTORS Administrative Organization, Cross Cultural Studies, *Cultural Factors, Educational Policy, *Governance, Government Role, *Political Influences, Political Power, *Power Structure, Teacher Associations
IDENTIFIERS *Israel

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the concepts of educational governance and educational politics, explores issues related to these concepts (with the aid of selected references to the American setting), and describes and analyzes developments in teacher selection for Israeli junior high schools. These developments demonstrate interrelationships between educational governance and educational politics. The final objective of the report is to construct a model for the purpose of analyzing similar interrelationships in other selected cultures. Underlining the model is the proposition that while educational governance is culture bound, patterns of educational politics are culture free. (Tables 1, 2, and 3 may reproduce poorly in hard copy because of marginal legibility). (Author)

EDO 43125

# GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN ISRAEL: CULTURE BOUND OR FREE?

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EA 003 076

## Abstract[1]

One intent of this paper is to examine the concepts of educational governance and educational politics. Issues related to these concepts are explored with the aid of selected references to the American setting. Another purpose is to describe and analyze developments in teacher selection for Israeli junior high schools. These developments constitute a case of interrelationships between educational governance and educational politics. The final objective is an attempt to construct a model for purposes of analyzing similar interrelationships in other selected cultures. Underlining the model is the proposition that while educational governance is culture bound, patterns of educational politics are culture free.


## Issues in the American Setting

Students of educational administration and of contexts of education have begun to make extensive use of the concepts of educational governance and educational politics relatively recently, perhaps only since the early 1950's. The growing use of these terms has facilitated the tasks of describing more validly and more reliably and of analyzing in greater depth previously somewhat unemphasized phenomena. Related tasks of searching for generalizations and useful guidelines for action have also benefited from the use of these terms.

One group of issues related to these tasks includes considerations of definitions of fundamental terms. Another group relates specifically to observations which are potentially generalizable. It is accentuated when attempts are made to designate extents or activities which constitute the beginning and the end of a given observation. A third group relates to prescriptive guidelines. Issues in this group arise from the dependence

of inquiries in education on orientations existing in social sciences, policy sciences and administrative sciences.

A choice of a particular definition for any given concept has far reaching implications so far as the substantive use of the concept in describing phenomena, analyzing them, generalizing about them, and prescribing guidelines related to them. Concern over the existence of a variety of operational definitions of educational governance and educational politics has given use to the need for searching for issues related to the definitions themselves and for attempting to resolve these issues. One issue related to a selection of a definition for educational governance is whether the concept should be viewed as a set of procedures or as a process. Consider three examples:

> (1) educational governance is a set of procedures by which policies, priorities and provisions of educational organizations are carried out by organizational officials; (2) educational governance is the maintenance of educational organizations' machinery which is necessary for organizational existence and for striving to accomplish desired organizational goals; and (3) educational governance is a decision-making process put into action, organization, rules and laws.

In an imaginary continuum where impersonal and formal procedures are placed on the left end and processes involving human interactions are placed on the right end, definition (1) lies far to the left, definition (3) lies far to the right, and definition (2) lies somewhere in between.

Closely related issues are whether or not to include actors in the definition, and, if they are included, in how much detail this should be done. Probably, the more procedure-related and the less process-related a definition of educational governance is, the more likely it is that actors should be included. While there does not seem to be an inherent need in definitions (2) and (3) to have actors included, the mention

of "officials" in definition (1) seems to make the definition more complete.

Situational imputs and outputs may also be included in operational definitions of educational governance. The problem is again how specific the descriptions should be. A specific description of an input or that of an output makes a definition highly comprehensive. Since both procedure and process-related definitions are usually quite comprehensive, they are likely to include a specific description of at least one of the portions, more often that of the output. Specific aspects of output in definition (1) are "policies, priorities and provision." Similar aspects in definition (2) are "action, organization, rules and laws." In definition (2), a purpose is described but it is relatively vague.

Definitions of educational politics seem to be not only process-related but also related to the specific process of making educational decisions. Martin[2] conceives of politics as centering on the principal foci of decision making. Since public school administration is a process in which decisions are arrived, the management of public schools is essentially politics. Kimbrough[3] offers a logical extension when he suggests that educational politics is the process of making educational decisions which are "basic" in nature. The problem is what exactly constitutes a "basic education decision." Consider a process involving making a decision as to whether an 8th grade American Government lesson should precede or follow a math lesson on Tuesdays. Is such a process identical with another such as making a decision as to whose influence should be brought to bear on a group of individuals for purposes of resolving a major employer-employee confrontation? The answer may be that while both processes "basically" involve education-related decisions, the variables defining the first process may be different than and perhaps not even

overlaping with, those which define the second process.

Rosenthal[4] offers a definable range for types of decisions which constitute components of the decision making process labeled educational politics. According to him, these decisions involve, at the least, matters of public relevance and, at the most, ways in which social institutions "reach settlements on problems of internal regulation or external relationships." Assuming even that this range is not easily extendible, it already allows for a large number of theoretically available interactions among individuals and institutions. This raises the issue of whether or not process-related definitions of educational politics should include descriptions of such interactions. Other issues relate to the nature of limitations imposed on the descriptions and to the criteria set for selection of the interactions to be included in the first place. Should a definition, for example, specify individuals or agencies involved in the interaction or not? Should it include a description of the flow of initiative? Should it identify power relationships? Iannaccone[5] confines the interaction to that of educationists and policy making bodies and includes in it a detailed description of a multidirectional flow of initiatives. Minar[6] establishes bases for analysis of the interaction in the form of power relationships. Such selections of specific items for definitions of educational politics guide researchers' criteria for emphases and de-emphases of phenomena and variables.

So far, issues related to educational governance were dealt with separately from issues related to educational politics. Additional issues are identified in the relationship between the two concepts. One issue is whether or not it should be assumed that phenomena reflecting educational governance overlap with those reflecting educational politics.

If the two are to be mutually exclusive, then confusion is, perhaps, avoided but data collection becomes disturbingly biased. Furthermore, at least three possibilities exist as follows: (1) there is no point of tangency between phenomena reflecting politics and those reflecting governance and the two are separated from each other by another set of phenomena; (2) there is one tangetial point where governance ends and politics begins; and (3) there are several tangetial points characterizing the boundaries.

By contrast, if phenomena reflecting educational governance and those reflecting educational politics are assumed to overlap, then problems arise as to the choice of variables identifying the overlap. Time, participants, location, and degree of formality of activities are examples of such variables. Other problems arise from difficulties in measuring amounts of overlap on each variable. The choice of variables and the amounts of overlap have a significant influence on the extent to which observations can be generalized. A special case of complete overlap where educational governance is synonomous with educational politics exists only if the total scope (i.e., variables and respective amounts of overlap) of one is identical with that of the other. That such a case exists is a matter of definition. Other possibilities in this category are those where educational governance is treated as a component of educational politics and those where educational politics is treated as a component of educational governance.

Another set of issues focuses on the extent to which it is necessary and desirable to resort to "non-educational" frameworks in dealing with educational governance and educational politics. As far as philosophy goes, a definition in education may be founded in "values" or educational ideologies, which are not easily, if at all, intrinsically alterable. The problem is that the less value-free a definition is, the less likely it

is to be universally accepted even though it may be a committing definition and one which has specific and relevant use. On the other hand, a definition which is more value free is probably more universally accepted, but it is also more likely to be uncommitting and of only broad significance.

As for other inquiry frameworks, the problem in education is which orientation to choose and why. More specifically, should hypotheses' formulations and prescriptions for action in educational governance and educational politics be guided by objectives and methodologies used in social sciences, policy sciences or administrative sciences, or should any or all be used in a manner where circumstances dictate a particular choice? If none is barred, then maximal capitalization on advantages of several ways of knowing is facilitated. A probable price is that educational governance and politics are again exposed to "values." This argument, incidentally, is probably not irrelevant to considerations of attempts to establish an educational sciences' base especially tailored for inquiries in politics and governance of education.

The problem of values has preoccupied the students of non-educational sciences themselves. The social sciences, for example, are seeking what Etzioni[7] calls an understanding of factors and mechanisms that facilitate a review of a society which is an "alternative." The fact that a society is coming to be viewed by social scientists not as a "condition" but as an alternative reflects their search for analytical tools which are value free. A parallel search is argued by Dror[8] for the policy sciences. Simon's effort[9] and Halpin's effort[10] are typical searches which have been initiated in the administrative sciences.

## A Case of Teacher Selection for Israeli High Schools

### Background

On July 29, 1968, the Israeli Knesset approved the recommendations

advanced by the specially appointed Parliamentary Committee regarding a change in the educational structure.[11] The change (Reform), formally proposed by the Ministry of Education, consisted primarily of replacing the existing 8-4 pattern with the 6-3-3 or the 6-6 patterns. As viewed by Ministry officials, the success of the Reform depended on criteria and methods of selecting teachers for the relocated seventh and eighth grades. Prior to the vote on the Reform, teachers in these grade levels had not been required to hold a university degree. Their teaching certificate had been awarded customarily upon completion of a two or three year teachers' college (Seminar). Along with the structural change, the Ministry insisted that teachers assigned to newly established junior high schools would have to possess a university degree in addition to their teaching certificate. The Ministry's plan was to staff the new schools with university credentialed graduates and with 40 to 50 percent of the then present seventh and eighth grade teachers who in order to become fully credentialed for junior high teaching, would need to undertake some inservice training together with their new teaching assignments. According to the plan the other 50 to 60 percent of the teachers in upper elementary school grades would discontinue to teach in grades 7 and 8 and would be reassigned to grades 1 - 6.

The Teachers Union, which is the oldest professional union and the largest association of educators in the country, opposed the Ministry's plan. The Union vowed that it would not allow for any inequality or differentiation among seventh and eighth grade teachers. Its original position was that all certified teachers who were then teaching in grades 7 and 8 would have the right to teach in junior high schools. The Union's opposition carried weight because the Union had had an influential historical

record which was not necessarily related to successes in battles over salaries and working conditions. From the time of its establishment in 1903, for example, until the First World War it had been engaged in setting up new educational institutions and in reinforcing existing ones. Later on it undertook the task of reviving Hebrew as a spoken language and a language of instruction. Since the 1920's, when government passed into the hands of the British, the Union's major objective was to nationalize education. This objective was achieved after the 1948 establishment of the state.[12]

The Association of Secondary School Teachers, which split away from the Union in 1958, supported the basic Ministry's plan. The 1958 split itself was over differences in organizational goals related to differentiations among teachers. In fact, secondary school educators had proposed a 6-6 plan as early as 1927.

While the Association interacts freely with the Ministry of Education, the relationship between the Union and the Ministry are underlined by the Union's affiliation with the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor. This Federation encompasses most professional associations of workers in the country. Responsibilities for collective negotiations with regard to workers' salaries were vested in 1948 in the hands of the Histadrut's department of professional association. Most decisions related to wage conflicts were made "centrally" between the Histadrut and large employers such as Government and the Association of Industrialists. Since the Histadrut itself owned some industrial concerns, it assumed at times the dual role of workers' representative and employer. The Histadrut has coordinated its work and managed its affairs in close contact with the Government. Since its decision making process has often been guided by considerations initiated by government and political parties, its capability to make its own independent long-range policy has weakened. Its function of workers' representa-

tion in serious conflicts has also been weakened considerably.[13]

Developments[14]

Formal contacts were initiated during the summer of 1968 between the Ministry of Education and the Teachers Union. Issues resulting from the Knesset's decision were clarified. Disagreements were identified between the two positions but no attempt was made to resolve the differences. Despite the differences the Ministry began to implement part of its plan in a few towns in September. Grades 7 were taken out of elementary schools and teachers for these grades were selected. The Union responded by deciding to call for a strike in grades 7 and 8 of schools in which teachers' working conditions had been worsened as a result of the changes. The strike threat facilitated a more active Histadrut's involvement in the dispute. The Histadrut's initial position was not to accept the Union's demands and not to assume an a priori role of the workers' representative. Instead, it advocated negotiations between the Union and the Ministry. Together with the Government (the cabinet as a whole) the Histadrut wished to assume the task of settling the dispute only in events where the parties themselves were unable to resolve their differences. Histadrut officials viewed such a joint body as an impartial party whose decision would be final and binding and which, in this sense, would assume an arbitrating role. After the Union's call for the strike, these officials were first to ask the Union to stop it.

The November strike called by the Union was designed to point out to the Ministry that it should consider more seriously the demands which the Union had presented. Part of these demands included either equal working conditions or equal wages for all teachers in grades 7 and 8. The Ministry, in turn, wished that the Histadrut would restrain the teachers by scaling down their demands. Because of the high degree of Union independence

within the Histadrut the Ministry wanted the Histadrut to engage in at least some conciliatory activities such as interpreting to the Union governmental limitations and advising it on wage considerations. With increased pressure exerted on it the Histadrut began to assume a more active role in attempts to resolve the dispute. This development was facilitated by the strike threat posed by the Association of Secondary School Teachers whose members since 1958 had ceased to belong to the Histadrut. The Association's demand for a 24-hour work week for teachers in high schools' grades 7 and 8 tempted a growing number of Union members whose own work week consisted of 30 hours to join the Association. At stake for the Histadrut, then, was its own membership.

While the Ministry insisted on developing selection procedures of teachers for grades 7 and 8 in the new high schools, the Union resisted any attempt to differentiate among teachers in grades 7 and 8 of existing elementary schools. In a joint "paritatic" committee of the Ministry and the Union which had been ordered by the Cabinet's Ministers Committee on Wage Matters, the representatives of the Union stated their demands for a 24 hour week for all teachers in all schools. With regard to selection of teachers for junior and six year comprhensive high schools they insisted that (1) a 3 year experience of 8 weekly hours of teaching in grades 7 and 8 would qualify a teacher for a transfer; (2) inservice training arrangements would be specified in the agreement; (3) decisions pertaining to disqualifying individuals for a transfer and to needed additional requirements for those wishing to qualify would be made by the joint committee; and (4) disqualified individuals would be allowed to retire earlier. The Director General of the Ministry of Education argued that a stricter selection procedure was mandatory because only 2000 of the 5000 teachers could be transferred. He asked that the Union agree to the proposed role of the Cabinet and the Histadrut in the negotiation process. The Union stated instead that negotiations could proceed only "after a basic

decision is made that working conditions of all teachers in grades 7 and 8 are uniform and equal".

In January of 1969 disagreements reached a deadlock. The Union called a strike over a principals' issue which had been closely related to the teachers' issue. It originally involved a demand that the Ministry return the pay for "two administrative hours" which it had taken away from an elementary school principal from whose school one class had been transferred to a comprehensive six year high school. This time the Histadrut sided with the Union and against the Ministry and its governmental partners. While the strike over the principal's pay was expanding, another strike was called by the Association. Theirs was a warning related to the weekly hours of seventh grade high school teachers. As disruptions in the schools intensified, and in the absence of proper compulsory arbitration laws, the Minister of Education found it necessary in February to propose to the Knesset to initiate arbitration. The Knesset did essentially nothing in this respect. Subsequently, Histadrut officials suggested that the Ministry and the Union agree on their own volition to submit all the disputed issues to arbitration. The Union agreed to voluntary arbitration only on selected issues which did not include the issues of the principals. Due to political party pressure and an unofficial guarantee to satisfy Union's demands regarding the principals' salaries the Union discontinued its strike. The Union did not agree to allow the government and the Histadrut to arbitrate on all the disputed issues. In March the Union returned to the battle over the matter of seventh and eighth grade teachers.

It took another serious threat by the principals and several informal contacts between Union and Histadrut officials and the Ministers of Finance, Labor and Education before the Ministers Committee on Wage Matters decided to return the status quo ante to the principals. In attempting to resolve

the impasses in the total negotiations procedure the Ministry and the Union voluntarily agreed in advance that the Minister of Labor be appointed as binding arbitrator with regard to the principals' issue and as mediator with regard to the issue of teachers in grades seven and eight. It was understood with regard to the teachers' issue that the mediator would have no power to force a settlement. Despite the agreement, the actual role of the Minister of Labor was unclear. In his absence the Ministers Committee reversed its decision to order a return to the principals' status quo ante. The arbitrator could not perform his role effectively and resigned in June. Following a threat by the Union's Secretary to the Minister of Finance that the Union might withdraw from arbitration altogether, the Minister ordered the Ministry of Education to return the monies to the principals. He expressed his hope that the teachers would continue to participate in arbitration. The Union agreed, on the condition that the process would be successfully terminated on or before July 4.

Early in July and following the appointment of another mutually accepted arbitrator, the Union agreed to postpone the July 4 deadline. It conditioned its agreement by a Ministry of Education guarantee that all its own activities related to teachers' differentiation and selection to high schools would be discontinued. The Union also demanded that arbitration regarding the principals' issue and mediation regarding the teachers issue would proceed with the principals' issue first. During August the Union threatened to take severe actions as soon as the school year began if by then no progress would have been achieved. Noting with satisfaction a Ministry of Education decision of a 24 hour work week for teachers in grades seven and eight in high schools, the Secondary School Teachers Association announced that it would not join any strike which might be called by the Union. Two days before the opening of the 1969-1970 school year, mutually agreeable compromises were achieved

between the Union and the Ministry of Education regarding almost all the initial disputed issues. The willingness on the part of both the Ministry and the Union not to hold on to all their original positions was facilitated considerably by political party pressure.

The compromises themselves, known as the "document", included as a minimum for qualifying to teach in junior high schools the Union's demand for "a score of 3.5 out of 5 as recorded by the inspector during 3 out of the teacher's last 5 years of employment." The Ministry's acceptance of this demand replaced the Ministry's previous practice of an ad hoc evaluation by the inspector. High school certification, which was demanded by the Ministry as another selection criterion, was also dropped. The Union insisted that those experienced and effective teachers who held a teachers seminar certificate (which did not require a high school matriculation certificate) were qualified to teach in junior high schools. In addition, instead of the Ministry's demand that inservice training for transferred teachers would be completed in 3 years and only in universities, the parties agreed on a period of 5 years and on "additional avenues for study." By contrast, the Union's demand of early retirement for older individuals who would not qualify for a transfer was not accepted. A promise had been secured from the Ministry that "advancing the inservice training of individuals over 50 years of age would be favored at the expense of that of others." The document focused on work hours of teachers in grades 7 and 8 and of principals. It was agreed that all certified teachers who had taught in grades 7 and 8 in at least 3 of their last 5 years would work instead of 30 hours, 27 hours during the 1969-70 school year, 26 hours in 1970-71, 25 hours in 1971-72, and 24 hours in 1972-73. The Union demanded a similar arrangement for the principals and it was so agreed.

As seen in this summary, issues related to teachers selection criteria

for grades 7 and 8 in newly established high schools were essentially issues involving judgements of teachers and people's worth. Such issues are extremely hard to resolve. The ease with which the teachers' work week and the principals' administrative stipends were interwoven with the selection criteria reaffirms the notion that negotiations over working conditions and money are simpler than those over evaluative criteria. Facilitating the interweaving process is the fact that all three problem areas involved many of the Union's male members. Their influence within the Union is proportionately higher than their numerical strength. They are relatively older, more highly represented in the Union's governing bodies and they care more for their economic, social and pedagogic status.

Responsibilities

The process of teacher selection for junior high schools has been shaped by several individuals and groups from the Ministry of Education and other ministries as well as from the teachers organizations, the Histadrut, the Labor Party and the Knesset. Significant developments within the process were guided by three distinctly different groups of individuals each of which assumed different types of responsibilities. High and medium level administrators in the Ministry of Education constituted one group. Their responsibilities were (1) to define and establish criteria for teachers' effectiveness, (2) to select the most effective teachers for junior high schools according to these criteria, and (3) to minimize any disruptions which might arise as a result of the selection process to the on-going process of education in the schools. The second group included leaders of the two educational associations--the Teachers Union and the Association for Secondary School Teachers. Their prime responsibility was to protect the interests of their respective memberships. Politicians, whose authority and behavior

derive exclusively from their position and status in the dominant Labor Party, constituted the third group. This group included individuals such as the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Finance and Labor, the Secretary General of the Histadrut, the Head of the Histadrut's department of Professional Association, the Secretary General of the Labor Party Secretariat and the Minister of Education himself. These and other less visible politicians have assumed the role of minimizing any effects which disputes resulting from the selection process had or might have had on the life of the party.

The types of responsibilities which the three groups have assumed with regard to the process of teachers selection corresponded respectively to their relative degree of responsibility for the administration of schools in general. The Ministry of Education has, in the legal sense, the ultimate responsibility for the administrative process. What distinguishes the leaders of the educational organizations from the Labor Party politicians is that while the educators have a strong desire to increase the extent of their responsibility, the politicians have no such desire.

The desire by educational organizations to assume a larger role in the administration of schools conflicts with attributes inherent in the legal functions and organization of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry interprets and implements legislative recommendations. It absorbs political demands and it initiates and implements administrative policies, priorities and provisions. Any "gain" in responsibility by the educational organizations is by definition a modification of the Ministry's role. To achieve such a gain the organizations must resort to actions which would influence Labor Party politicians to make modifications. This prerequisite is due to the fact that the Ministry's political power derives from the Labor Party and is, thus, smaller than the collective power of Labor Party politicians themselves.

The political power which the educational organizations possess is even smaller than that of the Ministry's.

With regard to the teacher selection process the interaction between the organizations' leadership and the Labor Party politicians has greatly modified the Ministry's role as originally prescribed and conceived. Early definitions and selection procedures formulated by the Ministry have been altered. Its original time schedule and intensity of activities have also changed. The Ministry's task of minimizing disruptions in the schools has become more difficult. Some decisions related to these changes were made in the Ministry but several others were made outside of it and without consultation with it.

## Toward An Analytical Model

### Concepts

It may be useful to view in a more general context of influence the roles which the Ministry of Education, leaders of educational organizations, and Labor Party politicians have assumed in shaping the process of teachers selection. Of relevance here is the impact which specific organizational patterns of government have on the process of educational administration. For analytical purposes, this impact may be seen as originating from two types of organizational attributes of the governmental agency. The first type includes those attributes which evolve legally and formally from the society's original and fundamental guiding principles, and which, with time, become perceived more and more as attributes inherent in the agency itself. The realization of influence derived from this type of organizational attributes reflects a process which may be labeled educational governance. The second type of attributes is limited to those attributes which get established independently of constitutional references, informally, and as a result of interactions between the governmental agency with other agencies, institutions, individuals

or any other interest groups. The realization of influence derived from this type of organizational attributes reflects a modified process of educational governance. The modification could be perceived as a form of politicization. The modified process itself may be labeled educational politics.[15]

Educational politics could proceed in at least three ways. One or more of the interest groups may be involved in decisions related to the administration of education without first consulting with the governmental agency and sometimes even with disregard to the agency's formal and legal responsibilities. This way of engaging in educational politics may be referred to as external. Internal ways of engaging in educational politics may constitute involvement in decisions related to the administrative process without formally circumventing the governmental agency. One internal way may proceed via securing from the outside control over one or more portions of the organizational authority structure and over excess to its financial resources. Another possibility is maintaining control over appointments to specific strategic positions in the organization which carry significant and predetermined degrees of formal authority and financial responsibility. Additional ways of engaging in educational politics may include combinations of the three ways already mentioned as well as specific variations of each one of them individually.

Phenomena of educational governance and of educational politics are closely related in Israel to roles assumed by political parties and to functions which they perform. The parties will be briefly discussed in the next section. A description of the general process of educational governance will follow. Then, three patterns of educational politics will be analyzed as derivatives of the case. An attempt will be made at the end to evaluate the conceptual model as an analytic tool.

## Political Parties[16]

Most political parties in Israel originated as ideological movements

prior to statehood or upon it in 1948. Herut--The Freedom Party was an extreme right wing party which represented muscular patriotism and original activism. The General Zionists Party was dominant in the World Zionist Organization and possessed a strong Western orientation. The Progressive Party originated as a left wing splinter from the General Zionists because of a greater affinity to labor and welfare interests. The National Religious Party outgrew from the Mizrachi Party in the World Zionist Organization. It has advocated that ethical and social principles of the Torah constitute the basis for life in Israel. The other, smaller, religious parties have been more extreme in their religious orthodoxy. Mapai--The Party of the Workers of Israel has been the largest and politically the strongest. While originally its orientation was strictly agrarian, it is now the principal exponent of a social welfare ideology. It advocates closeness to the West and stands for democracy and planned economy. Achdut Haavoda--The Unity of Labor Party, originally independent, merged with the Zionist Youth Movement to form the Mapai Party from which it split upon statehood. It was a non-Marxist, Socialist party. Mapam--The United Workers Party is a Marxist movement which, despite being pro-Soviet, has opposed communism in Israel.

Because of unidentical but changing feelings among the parties during the first half of this century toward the nature of a renewed State of Israel, and because of needs for readjustments of political ideologies to new realities since 1948, a number of alignments, splits and realignments have taken place among the parties. Following the 1969 general elections, the present 7th Knesset consists of 13 lists which are described in Table 1.

| Party in 7th Knesset | No. of Seats |
|---|---|
| Alignment (includes Labor-former Mapai, Achdut Haavoda and Rafi - and Mapam | 56 |
| Herut Liberal Block | 26 |
| National Religious Front | 12 |
| Kingdom List (remainder of former Rafi) | 4 |
| Independent Liberal Party | 4 |
| Torah Judaism | 4 |
| New Communist List | 3 |
| Free Center | 2 |
| Torah Camp | 2 |
| Cooperation and Brotherhood (an arabic party affiliated with Mapai) | 2 |
| Progress and Development (an arabic party affiliated with Mapai) | 2 |
| This World Movement | 2 |
| Communist Party | 1 |
| Total | 120 |

Table 1: Parties and Seats in the 7th Knesset

The fact that since 1948 the Israeli political parties have assumed a reinforced role of electoral competitors has minimized their roles as ideological persuaders but only within larger blocks of political ideologies rather than among such blocks. Table 2 describes the lack of significant changes among the blocks.

| Block | 1st Knesset 1949 | 2nd Knesset 1951 | 3rd Knesset 1955 | 4th Knesset 1959 | 5th Knesset 1961 | 6th Knesset 1965 | 7th Knesset 1969 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Labor Alignment (Mapai, Mapam Achdut Haavoda, Rafi) | 50.4 | 49.8 | 47.7 | 52.4 | 48.8 | 51.2 | 46.6 |
| Gahal (Herut, Liberals -General Zionists) | 16.7 | 22.8 | 22.8 | 19.7 | 27.4 | 21.3 | 21.5 |
| Religious Lists (National Religious Torah Judaism- Agndat Yisrael, Torah Camp- Poaley Agudat Yisrael) | 13.9 | 12.5 | 14.1 | 14.6 | 15.4 | 14.0 | 15.0 |
| Independent Liberals (Progressives) | 4.1 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 4.6 | ---- | 3.8 | 3.3 |
| Others | 14.9 | 11.7 | 11.0 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 9.7 | 13.6 |

Table 2: Blocks of Parties in the seven Knessets (in percentages)

Functioning simultaneously as electoral competitors and as ideological movements the political parties have become the most important subcultural groupings. As electoral competitors they have sought votes and provided a government. As ideological movements they have sought followers and converts, provided an "ideologically correct" way of life, and engaged extensively, though gradually less so with time, in political socialization of adults,

mostly immigrants. The potential impact of the socialization process is reflected in the fourfold increase in population between 1948 and 1968.

Characteristic of these functions has been political parties dominance in important aspects of governance at both the national and local levels. At the national level they controlled the cabinet which has been the main locus of legitimate authority. The largest and the single most powerful political group has always included Labor ministers only. These were individuals occupying the positions of Prime Minister, and Ministers of Finance, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Education, Labor, Agriculture and Police. Major decisions have often been made not in the cabinet or one of its standing committees, but rather in the Labor Party Central Committee. In addition, the public bureaucracy itself has been partially partisan.

Local government has been weaker than the national government. Considerations of political party realities and national-local relations are the prime reasons. Victories or failures in local elections have generally been a function of the degree of popularity of the individual heading a list regardless of whether the list is affiliated with a political party or not. Decisive majorities for any one political party have been lacking, and Labor has not had the advantage it has enjoyed nationally. Due to the large extent of fiscal dependence of local authorities, mayoralities negotiations have been tied with political party considerations at the national level. This has forced a growing number of local authorities to minimize the role of apolitical groups in the governing process. This has also facilitated the establishment of partisan local bureaucracies.

Another characteristic of political parties' functions has been their deep and comprehensive involvement, via the government and the Histadrut, in citizens' daily life, perhaps more than in most democratic systems. Traditionally, the Labor and the Housing ministries, for example, have been controlled

by the Labor Party. The Social Welfare and the Interior ministries have been controlled by the National Religious Party. Since the services which these ministries provide constitute a large proportion of the total like-services in the country, a given political party and a certain public service often become synonymous. Histadrut activities too, have been dominated by political party considerations. Members of the Federation of Labor vote under a proportional system both for the Federation as a whole and for their individual affiliated professional associations such as the Teachers Union, the Building Construction Union and the Sailors Union. Since the Histadrut encompasses a large portion of workers' professional associations and since its own decision making process has been guided by central committees of the various political parties, some of its functions, such as organization, villages, and education have often become, in the eyes of many workers, synonymous with certain political parties.

The predominance of political parties among other subcultural groups, on one hand, and the lack of significant changes in relative strength of large blocks of political ideologies as reflected by general elections, on the other hand, have been indicative of a low political efficacy of the individual citizen. The citizen's attitude has been that he could not influence significantly the political process, and this attitude has been shared by Knesset members as well. People's civic participation has proceeded mainly through political parties, but the leaders' own base has been the party and not the electorate. It seems, then, that the regime, though not a party regime, is more likely to be altered in the future by actions from within the ruling party itself rather than by opposition parties. Tacticly, the process of establishing an alternative could begin in a form of a coalition among most major parties. An indication of a potential change is perhaps the present Cabinet's makeup of 24 ministers representing 104 out of 120 Knesset seats.

Until now, however, and probably for some time to come, conservatism and an effort to minimize internal changes have been foci of political party activities.

Educational Governance

Despite being governed externally by the British authorities prior to independence, the politically pluralistic Jewish community in Palestine handled most domestic affairs by itself. Already in 1920, a Jewish quasi government was established in the form of an Assembly (Asefat Hanivcharim) elected by proportional representation which appointed the National Council (Vaad Leumi). The Council possessed executive and administrative powers over the Jewish community, and, through its various departments, provided services such as education, health and maintenance of the courts.

Since 1948 education has been a national responsibility and it has, thus, been assigned to a cabinet member who is officially responsible for the functions of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Minister's authority stems from Knesset confidence and several basic laws among which are the Compulsory Education Law, the State Education Law, the Higher Education Law and the Supervision Law. The Minister issues orders and regulations which make the administration of education relatively centralized in that most major decisions are made at the central office rather than in the local offices. The Minister also appoints the Education Committee and the Council for Religious State Education which serve as his advisory bodies. Together with the Prime Minister, the Minister signs every law which is to be implemented through his Ministry. While these laws are enacted by the Knesset, the Knesset's own Education Committee assumes only a minimal role in developing the proposals.[17]

Elementary education (K-8) and the newly labeled junior high school education (7-9) are free and compulsory. They are financed almost entirely by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry's Pedagogic Secretariat prescribes most

of the curriculum. Recommendations for principals' appointments advanced by inspectors and others must be approved by the Ministry's central office. The principal himself has authority over the teaching methods and the extracurricular activities in his school. Secondary schools (9-12) are financed jointly by the Ministry, local authorities and parents. Local authorities maintain the schools and the Ministry controls the curricula. The local authority has considerable authority over appointments of principals but these, in turn, are almost as dependent as their elementary school colleagues on Ministry's rules and regulations.

## Educational Politics: The Case

The process of educational governance in its present form is an outgrowth of societal developments. The dominant role of the political parties in the society was viewed as a component of the society's historical and cultural dimensions. In this section, three patterns of the process of educational politics will be outlined. They all derive from the case of teachers selection to new established high schools. The focus of the final section is a proposition that these three patterns and perhaps others as well constitute universal phenomena.

Although there are preliminary indications of engagements between August 1968 and August 1969 in internal educational politics, the discussion in this section is limited to engagements in external educational politics. The three patterns of educational politics or politicization of educational governance are labeled loosely as follows: (1) physical interference with educational governance, (2) search for utilization of political party power in educational decision making, and (3) establishment of contexts or settings for conflict resolutions. Although there is a certain amount of overlap among the three patterns

each of them will be separately defined. With the aid of selected examples from the case relevant to each pattern, the strategies adapted by the principal actors will be analyzed.

If one can imagine governance of education as a physical entity and if by interference one would mean entering into or taking part in concerns of others, then the first pattern of educational politics would be described as a physical or bodily interference with educational governance. All actors involved in this pattern of politicization have utilized direct methods of interference. They have not depended on any intervening bodies or agents to interfere for them. The interference itself has been directed primarily at altering policies, priorities and plans including their implementation. Broadly speaking, the interference initiated by educational associations has been of the highest degree and has varied relatively little with time. It has been exercised in a form of presenting demands to the governmental agency. The interference initiated by party politicians has been of a much lower degree and has varied significantly with time. It has been exercised by individuals or groups in a form of issuing orders or directives. The interference initiated by the governmental agency has been minimal. It has usually varied very little with time. Its minimal occurrance has been a function of internal disagreements.

The Teachers Union and the Association of Secondary School Teachers have interfered considerably with educational governance. This behavior was derived from their prime responsibility which has been to protect the interests of their members at times when those interests were in danger. Also, the educational organizations have had almost no responsibility for administering education but sought to possess more of it. By interfering, they have had almost nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain. The interference by the Association proceeded relatively simply. They demanded from the Ministry

of Education a 24 hour work week for seventh and eighth grade teachers who were or to be employed in secondary schools. Their sole criterion was employment in a secondary school while that of the Ministry included various educational qualifications. The Association engaged in short but significant actions such as a warning strike and a break up of a teachers inservice activity sponsored by the Ministry. The Union's strategy of interference was slightly more complex. Its origin was a demand to alter the Ministry's teachers selection plan. The Union held on primarily to the notion that the Ministry should not be allowed to make unilateral decisions which were final and binding. Later the Union demanded a 24 hour work week for all teachers in grades 7 and 8 in all schools. Their criterion was employment in these grades. They also demanded that the Ministry would return back an administrative stipend to principals from whose schools classes had been transferred. Because responses to these demands were delayed, the Union backed them by engaging in disruptions to the ongoing process of education in the schools. The Union's interference was a function of the heavy emphasis which the Union placed on its demands and of the Ministry's attitude that the most crucial issue to be resolved was the one involving selection criteria of teachers and no others.

Labor party politicians have varied the extent of their physical interference with the governance of education. Actions or inactions by individuals such as the Ministers of Finance, Labor and Education, or by groups such as the Ministers Committee on Wage Matters, the Histadrut's Executive and the Knesset, have been a function of their formal legal obligations as well as their assessment of the effect which specific situations have had on the Labor party as a whole. Since the Ministry of Education was controlled by a Labor party Minister these politicians have had no interest in increasing their own responsibility for the administration of education. The extent and frequency of their inter-

ference has not been related to desires for gains in administrative authority. In cases where they interfered, they have not exercised their initiative but rather they responded to pressure exerted on them by the Ministry of Education and/or by the organizations of educators. The need to minimize interferences of educational issues with the party's life legitimatized some of their decisions which effected the roles of politicians themselves. One example is the limited degree of freedom which the Ministers Committee granted to the Minister of Labor who served as the first arbitrator. Another example is the Finance Minister's directive to the Minister of Education to return the administrative stipend back to the principals despite the latter's opposition.

Because of its own dominant responsibility in administering the educational system the Ministry of Education not only minimized its own interference with educational governance but also adopted strategies of blocking interferences by educational organizations and Labor party politicians. The most obvious example of blocking potential interference from the Teachers Union was the Ministry's refusal to allow the Union to become an equal partner in deciding on selection criteria for teachers. Another example is the Ministry's maximal postponement of its own efforts to establish a "paritatic committee" as directed by the Ministers Committee. The sudden change in attitude of the Ministers Committee regarding the principals stipends was also facilitated by the Ministry of Education.

The second pattern of educational politics is the search for utilization of political party power for effecting educational decision making. In comparison to the first pattern, this pattern may be viewed as constituting an indirect method of interference with educational governance. This type of interference would be initiated primarily in cases where powers other than that deriving from the political party have been insufficiently strong to make

or change an educational decision. The extent of the search for use of political party power has varied with time. Among the principal actors, the educational associations and especially the Teachers Union have been most involved in this pattern of politicization. Labor party representatives within the Union's leadership have searched for the use of this power in a form of presenting demands and ultimatums to powerful individual Labor party politicians such as the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the party's Secretary General. The Ministry of Education has also been engaged to a somewhat considerable extent in this pattern of educational politics. The Minister himself has probably been the main or even the only person initiating his Ministry's involvement. Also, most of his contacts in this regard have probably been only with other powerful Labor party politicians. Relevant data to substantiate this assumption are unavailable. The search by Labor party politicians for the use of political party power has been minimal. Although data are lacking here too, it could be assumed that when such a search did occur it was also accomplished via informal contacts among Labor party powerfuls.

Labor party representatives in the Teachers Union have possessed only limited power which derived from their political party affiliation. Their efforts in bringing their case to the attention of the party executive, secretariat, or individual powerful politicians was a reflection of their desire to present to a political forum what they felt was a convincing educational case. This strategy was not necessarily designed to make them more powerful politicians (although they wished that they had more political party leverage) but rather to facilitate a hearing in which the status of their testimony was equal to, in the formal political sense, and not lower than that of the Ministry of Education. The letters written by the Union's Secretary General and by its Treasurer to various Labor politicians have served the same goal. Their search for uses of political party power in a way that was completely visible stemmed

from their hope that an open resolution of educational issues by politicians would not be dominated by political party considerations as much as a resolution behind closed doors would. This was a matter of life and death for the Union because it possessed less power derived from the party than the Ministry did.

There is insufficient information about contacts among Labor politicians with regard to the search by the Ministry of Education and by the politicians for utilization of political party power. Strategies adapted by these actors can be described only as hypotheses. The Ministry possessed more power derived from the Labor party than the Union did. This allowed the Ministry to seek the use of such power in cases where nothing else helped. Such a search had to be performed secretly in order to avoid a situation where educational issues are resolved by means of political party bargaining. On the other hand, since all the political power which the Ministry possessed derived from the Labor party, the Ministry was essentially at the mercy of the party in those cases where it sought the intervention of party politicians. Stated differently, any time the Minister of Education himself sought the use of political party power to resolve educational disputes, he exposed his own political status in the party as a negotiable item. The strategy which he adopted then, was not to search excessively for the use of party power. In cases where this was a must he proceeded to search in the most invisible manner--invisible also to his political colleagues. A similar strategy was adopted by other Labor party politicians as individuals as well as a group, except that they tended to use political power to a much smaller extent than the Education Minister did. Those among them who were concerned with other issues such as finance, labor, defense and industry needed to conserve their own political party power for purposes of resolving other issues that were dearer to them than educational issues were.

The third pattern of educational politics is characterized by the establishment of settings or contexts for conflict resolution. This pattern is

similar to the second one in that it, too, constitutes an indirect method of interference with educational governance. It represents activities which either circumvent established organizational patterns or capitalize on "irregular" organizational patterns of the governmental agency. These activities do not in themselves involve making educational decisions. They are designed rather to create conditions which would eventually have significant impact on where the visible scenes of conflict resolution would be located and how long it would take before agreements are reached. The Ministry of Education and the educational associations have been actively engaged in this type of educational politics almost on a continuous basis and especially with regard to issues which interfered with the administration of the schools. The Ministry has attempted to create conditions which would remove the scene of conflict as far as possible from itself and which would allow for as much time as possible before the conflict resolution would actually take place. The educational associations have tried to create conditions which would bring the scene of conflict as close as possible to the Ministry and which would facilitate conflict resolution. The politicians have engaged only minimally in this kind of educational politics although they have assumed the most dominant role in deciding the nature of such conditions.

The Ministry of Education has been charged with major responsibilities for educational governance. Right at the outset it clarified for the Union that any decision taken by anyone with regard to teacher selection criteria would have to have the ultimate approval of the Ministry. With regard to the other issues, which in the eyes of the Ministry tended to interfere with the smooth operation of educational governance, the Ministry has been totally uncooperative. It searched to create conditions which would facilitate the establishment of settings for their disputes with the educational groups. The Ministry

was in no hurry to contribute its share toward the actual resolutions of the conflicts. The setting which was most convenient for the Ministry for its disputes with the Union was the Histadrut's executive and its Central Committee. Such a setting removed the actual battle completely away from the Ministry. It also provided for a higher Ministry's potential for success because the Histadrut's leadership was subjected to political party pressure from the outside. The setting which was not as convenient for the Ministry was the Ministers Committee on Wage Matters. Issues which had not been resolved in the Histadrut and disputes between the Ministry and the Association were brought before this committee. There, the Ministry had to confront the other party to the dispute, but not directly. An even less convenient setting for the Ministry was the Labor Party Secretariat. Only disputes with the Union could be brought to the Secretariat because the Association was neither affiliated with the Histadrut nor governed by Labor Party representatives.

The educational groups desired to confront the Ministry directly. They had nothing to lose by such a confrontation because they had no jurisdiction over the governance of education and, thus, no worries regarding disruptions in the administration of the schools. An arbitration situation on selective issues was also acceptable to them because it, too, consisted of a direct confrontation. The Ministers Committee was less attractive to them as a setting for resolving disputes. For the Union, the Histadrut Central Committee was even a less favorable setting. The general strategy adapted by the educational groups was to confront the Ministry as directly as possible and to resolve the differences as rapidly as possible.

Labor party politicians were involved in making the decisions regarding the establishment of the contexts for conflict resolution. This role minimized their engagement in creating conditions which determined the settings themselves.

It also forced their minimal involvement in such a creation to follow a strategy which was similar to the one they adopted in the second pattern of educational politics, that of utilization of political party power in educational decision making. One politician who may not have belonged to this category of actors is the Labor Party Secretary General.

Model As Analytic Tool

The following is a suggestion, perceived as one among other possibilities of an analytical tool which might be of use in examining cross cultural political contexts of education. The process of teacher selection for junior high schools as described and analyzed in this paper constitutes a case in external educational politics in one culture. A summary of observations of each pattern of educational politics follows a format which is applicable to all groups of actors. The format consists of factors facilitating the initiation of each pattern, its form, and the extent to which it is exercised. Table 3 describes these observations.

As a major hypothesis it is suggested that the three patterns of educational politics as well as the various specific forms of interference with educational governance may all exist in more than one culture. Built into this hypothesis is the proposition that a given form of educational governance itself is a direct reflection of unique characteristics of a given culture. In a preliminary form, the hypothesis is limited to the inclusion of only those cultures where the governmental educational agency is considerably centralized and possesses a relatively high degree of administrative authority as compared to the local branches. The hypothesis is a result of inductive reasoning. One way of testing it would simply be to identify similar forms of interference (both events and strategies) in other cultures. A more ambitious, indirect and potentially reinforcing test would be to identify other forms of

| Pattern of Politicisation of Educational Governance | Principal Actors | Factors Facilitating Interference: Need of Self Protection | Degree of Direct Responsibility for the Administration of Education | Extent of Possession of Influence Derived From Political Party Power | Intensity of Interference | Form of Interference or Blocking Interference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct physical interference | Educational associations | Yes | Almost none Showing desire for more | Not crucial | High | Interference by initiating demands and ultimatums to governmental agency. |
| | Party politicians | Yes | None other than the legal but indirect. No desire for more | Not crucial | Low | Interference by responding to pressures by issuing orders or directives to the governmental agency. |
| | Ministry of Education | Yes | High | Not crucial | Almost none | Interference by internal disagreements. Blocking interference by delay of cooperation. |
| Indirect interference via a search for utilization of political party power | Educational associations | Not crucial | Almost none | Low | High | Interference by exposing educational issues for consideration by politicians |
| | Party politicians | Yes | Not crucial | High | Almost none | Interference by responding to contacts. Blocking interference by informal contacts. |
| | Ministry of education | Partly | High | Medium | Medium | Interference by initiating informal contacts. |
| Indirect interference by establishing contexts for conflict resolution | Educational associations | Yes | Almost none | Not crucial | High | Interference by seeking to confront the governmental agency directly, and by seeking cooperation from the agency for joint efforts. |
| | Party politicians | Partly | None other than the legal but indirect | Not crucial | Low | Interference by responding to pressures by issuing orders or directives to the governmental agency and to the educational associations. |
| | Ministry of Education | Yes | High | Not crucial | High | Interference by seeking to remove the setting as far as possible from the ministry, by avoiding face to face confrontation with the educational associations, and by avoiding cooperation for joint efforts with them |

Table 3: Summary of Observations of Patterns of Educational Politics.

interference and other patterns of educational politics (both external and internal) in two or more cultures.

The rest of the hypotheses reflect deductive reasoning. They are derived from relations found in the summary of observations of educational politics. One hypothesis rests on the assumption that individuals and groups pay a considerable amount of attention to the protection of their own self. Thus, the more a group or an individual feels that as a result of a certain decision its welfare is in jeopardy, the more intensively it will be involved in altering that decision. Another hypothesis is that the degree of care with which individuals or groups handle events related to a certain function is positively and significantly associated with the degree of responsibility which they have for this function. A final hypothesis is that the extent of influence which individuals and groups might lose in regard to a certain function is positively and significantly associated with the extent of influence which they have in regard to that function if (a) some change occurs in the function, and (b) there exists some kind of an upper limit on the extent of influence available. A way to test these hypotheses is to identify observations similar to the one detected in this case in one or more additional cultures.

## Footnotes

1. A revised version of a paper prepared for presentation in a Symposium titled "Governance of Education or Politics of Education: A Cross Cultural Examination" at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Minneapolis, March 2-6, 1970). For the Symposium's abstract, see William Pilder, (ed) 1970 Annual Meeting Symposia, Abstract II. (Washington, D.C.: American Educational Research Association, 1970) pp. 63-64.

2. Roscoe Martin, Government and the Suburban School, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962) p. 53.

3. Ralph Kimbrough, Political Power and Educational Decision Making, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964) p. 274.

4. Alan Rosenthal, Governing Education, (New York: Doubleday, 1969) p. IX.

5. Lawrence Iannaccone, Politics in Education, (New York: Center for Applied Research in Education) 1967.

6. David Minar, "Community Characteristics, Conflict, and Power Structures", Robert Cahill and Steven Hencley (eds.) The Politics of Education. (Danville, Illinois, Interstate, 1964) Ch. 7.

7. Amitai Etzioni, "Toward A Keynesian Theory of Social Processes", World Politics, Vol. XXII, October 1969, No. 1, p. 140.

8. Yehezkel Dror, "Analytical Approaches and Applied Social Sciences", Rand Corporation Reprint, No. P-4248, November, 1969.

9. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York: McMillan, 1961) pp. 4-8.

10. Andrew Halpin, Administrative Theory in Education, (New York: McMillan, 1958) pp. 1-19.

11. For developments leading to the Knesset's decision see: Naftaly S. Glasman, "Structural Reform in Israeli Education," Jewish Education, vol. 39, No. 2, April 7, 1969, pp. 25-32. For analyses of these and more recent developments see Naftaly S. Glasman, "Dilemmas in the Process of Educational Administration in Israel," School and Society, vol. 97, No. 2319, October 1969, pp. 392-395; and "A Structural Change Proposal in the Israeli Schools: Conflict and Conquest," The Journal of Educational Administration, vol. 8, No. 1, May 1970 (in press).

12. For more details see Shalom Levine, The Teachers Union in Israel (Tel Aviv: Israel Teachers Union Publishers, 1961).

13. For background see the various issues of The Histadrut Yearbook; A. Malchin, "The Histadrut in the State," Ovnayeem, vol. I (1961); Y. Olitzki, ed., Report Chapters 1959-1965 (Tel Aviv: The General Federation of Labor, The Executive Committee, 1968) (all in Hebrew); Y. Yagol, Changes Within the Hebrew Working Movement (Tel Aviv: M. Neuman Pub., 1948); and S. N. Eisenstadt, The Israeli Society: Background, Development and Problems (Jerusalem: Magnes Pub., The Hebrew University, 1967, Part II, Ch. 2, Section 3.

14. This section is based on a case study reported in Naftaly S. Glasman, "Bargaining and Its Effects on Administration and Policy: The Case of Education in Israel", (Unpublished paper, University of California, Santa Barbara, January 1970), pp. 6-35.

15. This definition of educational politics could serve as a guide to definitions of the politics of various subdisciplines of education. See, for example, a definition and its operational use of the "politics of educational planning" in Naftaly S. Glasman, "Major Planning Activities in Israeli Education: Politically Dictated Improvisations," The Journal of Educational Thought, vol. 3, No. 1, April 1969, pp. 29-40.

16. General references are: Marver Bernstein, The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1959); Oscar Krains, Government and Politics in Israel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Lester Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), Yehezkel Dror, The Israeli Political System (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), and Leonard Fein, Politics in Israel (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

17. Legal foundations of education are described in Ruth Stanner, The Legal Basis of Education in Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture, 1963).